From Law wiki, the wiki for law research

The facts of this case ([1993] AC 593) are unexiting but it has profound constitutional implications, as it ruled that judges may refer to Hansard as a guide to interpretation of legislation. The case concerns the taxation provisions of the Finance Act (1976). A group of teachers at a fee-paying school were allowed to have their children educated at the school at reduced cost. The Inland Revenue wished to take the total cost of the education as a taxable benefit, whereas the teachers pointed out that the cost to the school was minimal, as the children were occupying places that the school could not otherwise have filled. There were specific provision for situations like this in the Act (s.61-3), but they were ambiguous as to the calculation of the benefit. However, a passage in Hansard, reporting the discussion of the Bill preceding the Act, clearly stated that the original intention was for such benefits to be taxed on the marginal cost to the employer, as the teachers wished.

The reason this case pressed the issue of reference to extra-statutory sources so forcefully is that the intention of Parliament, as revealed by Hansard, was at odds with the best literal interpretation of the statute. Lord Browne-Wilkinson said: Having once looked at what was said in Parliament, it is difficult to put it out of mind. ... before seeing the Parliamentary materials, I had reached the conclusion ... that the revenue's submissions were correct. If it is not permissible to take into account what was said by the Financial Secretary, I remain of the same view. In other words, access to the Hansard report completely reversed the interpretation of the enactment.

In allowing access to Hansard, this case overturned a principle of at least 300 years' standing (although it appears that judges did refer to Hansard unofficially). It was suggested by the Attorney General at the time that it may also conflict with Article 9 of the Bill of rights, which prevents the debates and discussions of the House of Commons being questioned or impeached elsewhere. It now seems to be accepted that this provision sought to prevent the rule of Parliament being reversed or nullified, not to prevent it being discussed. However, the decision does raise some troublesome constitutional issues, most of which remain unresolved.

• If a court can take a Parliamentary debate as more authorative than a Statute, does this not open the way for some very free interpretations of the law? In this case there was no question of this, but it sets a precedent for others which might not be so cautious.
• Who will bear the increased costs? Clearly it may take longer to research a case, and to reach a decision, if an additional large volume of material is made available.
• Could a binding precedent be distinguished from a particular case on the basis that it was made on an interpretation of statute that was not in accord with the intention of Parliament as revealed in Hansard? If so, how far can this be taken? Could East Dogpatch Magistrates reject a finding of the House of lords on this basis?

The House of lords was anxious that the decision in Pepper v Hart not be given to wide an effect. In particular, Hansard would only be admissible where:

• ... it clearly discloses the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention lying behind the ambiguous or obscure words., and
• (in general) the statement is made by the promoter of the Bill (e.g., a Minister).