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The claimants were police officers who were severely traumatised by their duties at the aftermath of the Hillsborough Stadium disaster. They claimed compensation for their psychiatric injury against the police service.

In the Court Of Appeal at least some of the claims succeeded, although none of the claimants could be considered a 'primary victim' in the terms of Page v Smith (1996). None was exposed to any personal physical danger, and none would have succeed on the criteria in Alcock V CC South Yorkshire Police (1991). Instead their claims succeeded either because they were deemed to be rescusers (see liability to rescuers), or because their 'employer' (the police service) owed them a duty of care to prevent psychiatric trauma.

In the house of lords all these contentions were rejected. Part of the reason for this was undoubtedly public policy -- since all the claims for compensation by relatives of the victims had already been rejected it could, and did, cause a public furore that police officers would be compensated in less deserving cases. In addition, the House held (by a majority) that employers did not have a prima facie duty of care to prevent psychiatric injury, and that rescusers did not become 'primary victims' by the mere fact of being rescuers. The effect of this decision is that the Alcock test applies to all psychiatric injury claims where personal injury is not reasonably forseeable; employees and rescuers do not get special consideration.

Facts of the Case

The claimants were police constables on duty for maintaining law & order during a football match in April 1989 at Hillsborough Stadium. As a result of overcrowding and the consequent stampede, 95 people died and hundreds of others sustained injuries. The policemen on duty, including the claimants, had to tend to the victims for whom many of them suffered psychiatrically (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder or PTSD). Four of them were on duty at the stadium, and the fifth one was responsible for stripping bodies and completing casualty forms at a hospital. Resultantly, they claimed compensation for their psychiatric injury from the police department.

Findings of Trial Judge

The trial judge, Waller J., while dismissing the claims, observed:

1. That a relationship similar to master and servant existed between the police department and the plaintiffs, which, inter alia, includes the duty of care embracing psychiatric illness; 2. That the duty did not arise where the plaintiff was a secondary victim, unless he can prove that he was a rescuer; 3. That such a duty does not place a police officer in any better position than a bystander, and since a bystander could not claim, a duty-bound policeman’s claim is liable to be rejected since he was a professional rescuer not intimately participating in the incident itself, or in the immediate aftermath.

Decision by Court of Appeal

Upholding the appeal of the four claimants who were on ground duty at the stadium, the Court of Appeal held:

1. That the injury was caused in the course of employment irrespective of whether the employee would otherwise have been classified as a primary or a secondary victim; 2. That a tortfeasor owed the rescuer a duty of care in respect of psychiatric injury sustained during the rescue, even if the rescuer would otherwise be classified as a secondary victim, so that each of the plaintiffs who was present at the ground was owed a duty of care as a servant, or as a rescuer, or both.

Verdict Of House of lords

Overruling the judgment of Court of Appeal, House of lords upheld the trial judge’s findings and observed:

1. An employee who suffered psychiatric injury in the course of his employment must prove liability under the general rules of tort. The mere fact that his relationship with the tortfeasor was that of employer-employee did not make him a primary victim, and hence did not put him in any better position than an ordinary civilian claimant; 2. The rescuers did not become ‘primary victims’ by the mere fact of being rescuers. Since the plaintiffs were not within the range of foreseeable physical injury, their claims based on their position as rescuers could not succeed.

In essence, the House of lords upheld the application of Alcock Control Mechanisms {Alcock v The Chief Constable Of South Yorkshire Police ([1991] 4 All E R.907)} in all psychiatric injury claims where personal injury is not reasonably foreseeable.